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Abstract

Keywords: explicit transport error notification (ETEN), explicit loss notification (ELN), explicit congestion notificaWireless and satellite networks often have non-negligible tion (ECN), wireless and satellite networks, TCP perforpacket corruption rates that can significantly degrade TCP mance, congestion, corruption, bit errors, channel fades.
performance. This is due to TCP’s assumption that every
packet loss is an indication of network congestion (causing
TCP to reduce the transmission rate). This problem has received much attention in the literature. In this paper, we 1 Introduction
take a broad look at the problem of enhancing TCP performance under corruption losses, and include a discussion of The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [35] is the most
the key issues. The main contributions of this paper are: widely used transport protocol in the TCP/IP suite by to(i) a confirmation of previous studies that show the reduc- day’s common Internet users and applications. One obstation of TCP performance in the face of corruption loss, and cle to good performance of TCP over internetworks with
in addition a plausible upper bound achievable with perfect wireless and satellite components is non-negligible bit-error
knowledge of the cause of loss, (ii) a classification of the rates (BER). TCP guarantees that corrupted data will be repotential mitigation space, and (iii) the introduction of a transmitted by the data sender, hence providing a reliable
promising new mitigation that employs rich cumulative in- byte-stream to applications. However, packet loss is also
formation from intermediate nodes in a path to form a better used by TCP to determine the level of congestion in the netcongestion response.
work [23] – as traditionally, the bulk of packet loss in netWe first illustrate the performance implications of works comes from router queue overflow (i.e., congestion).
corruption-based loss for a variety of networks via simu- Therefore, to avoid congestion collapse TCP responds to
lation. In addition, we show a rough upper bound on the packet loss by decreasing its congestion window (cwnd)
performance gains a TCP could get if it could perfectly de- [23, 4], and therefore the sending rate. The reduction of
termine the cause of each segment loss – independent of the congestion window is not needed to protect network staany specific mechanism for TCP to learn the root cause of bility in the case when losses are caused by corruption and
packet loss. Next, we provide a taxonomy of potential prac- therefore these needless reductions in the sending rate have
tical classes of mitigations that TCP end-points and inter- a negative impact on a connection’s performance with little
mediate network elements can cooperatively use to decrease (if any) overall benefit to the network.
the performance impact of corruption-based loss. Finally,
we briefly consider a potential mitigation, called cumulative
explicit transport error notification (CETEN), which covers a portion of the solution space previously unexplored.
CETEN is shown to be a promising mitigation strategy, but
a strategy with numerous formidable practical hurdles still
to overcome.

If a TCP sender can distinguish packets lost due to congestion from packets lost due to corruption, better performance
may be achieved. The performance benefit can be realized if
TCP can retransmit a packet lost due to corruption without
needlessly reducing the transmission rate, while continuing
to protect network stability by decreasing the sending rate
when loss is caused by network congestion.

 Pre-print: Accepted for publication in Elsevier Computer Networks.

Several approaches have been proposed in the literature to
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distinguish congestion losses from corruption losses. For
instance, methods to implicitly distinguish corruption from
congestion have, thus far, not been successful [10, 16].
However, Performance Enhancing Proxies (PEPs) [12] have
been shown to improve TCP performance [7], but break the
end-to-end semantics of the transport layer connection. In
addition, PEPs that require intrusive header inspection are
not able to impact encrypted traffic (e.g., traffic utilizing
IPsec [26]). Earlier work on explicit loss notification in the
context of TCP over wireless and satellite links is described
in [9, 8, 41, 40]. An analysis of situations that can benefit from explicit transport error notification (ETEN) mechanisms is given in [16].

the end of a particular link and reports all corruption-based
loss to a TCP sender. The TCP endpoint registers with the
Oracle (indicating a desire to receive corruption reports) and
when a corruption loss occurs the Oracle instantaneously
notifies TCP of the corruption-based loss. We modified the
TCP sender to record these notifications in a table for later
use during loss recovery. Of course, this mechanism is not
realistic, but rather the instantaneous and perfect knowledge
the Oracle supplies provides an upper bound on how potential strategies to mitigate the impact of corruption-based
loss could work.

When TCP enters its traditional loss recovery phase via fast
retransmit all losses are repaired per a standard loss recovThe goal and contribution of this paper is as follows. First, ery technique (e.g., using SACK [28]). Stock TCP reduces
unlike previous work in this area, the bulk of this paper ex- the congestion window (cwnd) by half upon a fast retransplores the problems caused by corruption-based loss and mit. When using the Oracle, TCP queries the table of known
possible mitigations in a broad and generic fashion without corruption-based losses. If the segment being transmitted
regard to any particular mitigation mechanism. To this end, via fast retransmit was dropped due to corruption the cwnd
Section 2 illustrates the impact of corruption-based packet is not reduced, and furthermore, a flag is set indicating the
losses on standard TCP performance across a variety of net- cwnd has not been reduced in the current window of data.
work topologies and traffic patterns. Additionally, Section 2 If additional losses within the current window occur and are
establishes a rough upper bound on the performance a TCP congestion-based (i.e., no Oracle notification for the loss
can attain if the TCP can perfectly determine the cause of was received) the TCP will reduce cwnd upon retransmisa dropped segment (via using an “Oracle” that knows the sion of the first congestion-based loss in the window and
cause of each loss). Next, Section 3 presents a detailed tax- clear the flag that indicates a congestion response has not
onomy of the possible methods for mitigating the effects of been invoked. This scheme is similar to using TCP SACK
corruption-based loss, including the pros and cons of vari- [11] or TCP NewReno [19] in that one cwnd reduction per
ous schemes. In Section 4 we depart from the broad, generic “loss event” is taken.
terms of the previous sections and present a preliminary ex- In the case of loss detected via the retransmission timeout
amination of a novel mechanism for coping with corruption- (RTO), TCP behaves the same regardless of whether Orabased losses using cumulative information provided by the cle notifications have arrived. In other words, Oracle notinetwork. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude and summarize. fications have no impact after an RTO. While in any given
situation this is necessarily sub-optimal a clean and general
approach remains illusive. Upon an RTO expiration TCP
2 Can ETEN Help?
generally makes the decision that all segments sent are no
longer in the network (and the SACK scoreboard is cleared).
In this section we present several simulations to con- Therefore, if the sending TCP uses Oracle notifications to
cretely illustrate TCP’s performance problems caused by determine that a cwnd reduction is not necessary a potencorruption-based loss across a variety of network types. tially large burst of segments may be sent (bursts can cause
In addition to the impact on stock TCP, we examine a congestion in some cases [22]). A second problem is that
TCP variant that uses “Oracle” notifications to gain perfect retransmission after an RTO is fairly gross with TCP often
knowledge about the cause of packet loss and therefore can sending many more segments than necessary [3]. Theremitigate the performance issues. We believe this second fore, in the vast majority of the cases (based on the data preTCP variant, discussed in section 2.1, is a plausible upper- sented in [3]) a segment would be retransmitted for which
bound on the performance gains a TCP could expect from no Oracle notification was received (and, in fact was not
a scheme to combat the issues created by corruption-based even lost) and therefore cause a cwnd reduction.
loss.
Finally, we note that in some cases (e.g., highly interactive traffic) the optimal response to an Oracle notification
would be to retransmit the corrupted segment immediately.
2.1 Oracle Notifications
However, retransmission outside of a traditional TCP loss
recovery period ends up having implications later in the
We extended the ns-2 simulator [31] (version 2.1b9) to sup- connection due to the reordering of events. The problem
port our simulations. We added an “Oracle” to ns that sits at
2

section. TCP’s goodput2 at these BERs effectively makes
the plots presented in this section more difficult to read by
stretching the y -axis by several orders of magnitude. Therefore, we omit these simulations from the following discussions, but summarize the simulations with the following two
points: First, TCP performs quite poorly at very high BERs
(often obtaining an average of less than 1 byte/sec). Second,
we find that the Oracle notifications do not help TCP performance in this regime due to the excessive loss and RTO
behavior (including RTO backoff).

stems from a retransmission being queued behind packets
with higher sequence numbers. This causes the TCP receiver to transmit duplicate ACKs, which the sender, in
turn, uses to detect loss. The TCP sender then needs to
remember which segments have been retransmitted outside
the traditional loss recovery phase and which have not. Accordingly the TCP sender must be able to determine when
and if to invoke congestion control. We believe that such issues could be worked out given enough effort at redesigning
TCP’s traditional notions. However, in this paper we focus
on bulk transfers, in which case the key objective is to keep
the sending rate from being needlessly reduced. Therefore,
we did not focus on optimizing when retransmits are sent
with respect to the delay in getting the data to the receiver.

Goodput (bytes/sec)

10e6

2.2 Single Flow Simulations
The first set of simulations involves a simple topology with
one link between the sender and receiver. The goal of these
simulations is to illustrate the impact of corruption-based
loss on TCP performance, as well as to show a plausible
upper-bound on the performance that could be achieved
with a perfect-knowledge mitigation.

Stock SACK
SACK w/ Oracle

10e5

10e4

10e3

10e2
0

In our simulations, we use three different combinations of
bandwidth and delay for the link, as follows: (i) a LongFat Network (LFN) with a one-way delay of 250 msec1 and
bandwidth of 10 Mbps, (ii) a Short-Fat Network (SFN) with
a one-way delay of 25 msec and bandwidth of 10 Mbps and
(iii) a Long-Thin Network (LTN) with a one-way delay of
250 msec and bandwidth of 1.5 Mbps. All transfers are
run for 30 minutes (ensuring that even when corruption is
a very low rate event it happens in every transfer). We applied a uniform bit-error rate (BER) of 10 4 –10 11 to the
link. The highest error rate is just under 1% packet loss
rate – above which TCP does not cope well. We used the
ns standard FullTcpSack TCP variant. The TCP advertised
window was set to 2400 segments – large enough to never
be a factor in our simulations. TCP uses a segment size of
536 bytes. The capacity of the drop-tail queues applied to
the link is set to the delay-bandwidth product of the network. In all the following plots the point on the far left side
of the figure (at a BER of zero) is a baseline transfer with
no corruption drops. In this paper we report the mean of
30 runs with each set of simulation parameters.
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Figure 1: LFN: Oracle vs. Stock SACK TCP

Figure 1 shows the performance of a single TCP connection over the LFN topology as a function of the bit-error
rate plotted on a log-log scale. The plot shows the general degradation of performance as the BER increases for
stock TCP. The reduced performance motivates the study of
mechanisms to mitigate the dramatic reduction in goodput
caused by corruption-based loss. In this situation we note
that even at a BER of 10 11 the performance of stock TCP
has been reduced by roughly 10% when compared to the
corruption-free case 3 .
The plot also shows that with perfect knowledge of the
cause of drops TCP can improve performance dramatically.
However, as the BER increases the performance suffers
even with the Oracle’s assistance. In this regime, the RTO
plays a large part in loss recovery – which means that the
perfect knowledge that has been gathered cannot be reasonably applied, as discussed in Section 2.1. In our LFN sim-

The simulations with BERs of 10 4 and 10 5 follow the
trends shown in the following results. Furthermore, at
these BERs, the difference in performance between stock
SACK TCP and SACK TCP enhanced with Oracle support
is nearly non-existent in all simulations presented in this

2 The

goodput of a flow is defined as the bandwidth delivered to the
receiver, excluding duplicate packets [20]. We calculate the goodput by
dividing the total number of unique bytes arriving at the receiver by the
duration of the TCP connection (Note: the header bytes of these unique
packets are also included).
3 This aspect is difficult to see on the figure due to the logarithmic scaling of the axes; we use the logarithmic scaling in order to best illustrate
how the overall performance varies with BERs across several orders of
magnitude.

1 The propagation delay between the Earth and a geo-synchronous satellite is roughly one-eight of a second, yielding a one-way propagation delay
of 250 msec and a round-trip time of 500 msec.

3

ulations without corruption-based loss the RTO timer never
fired. On the other hand, the RTO timer expires an average
of 117 times during the Oracle assisted transfers at a BER
of 10 6 (and an average of 130 times without the Oracle).

Goodput (bytes/sec)
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These results suggest that mechanisms to conduct loss recovery without relying on the RTO timer when the sending
rate is low would be useful. Such mechanisms would reduce
the need for the gross loss recovery that the RTO timer often
causes [3]. In turn, finer-grained loss recovery may help the
TCP sender determine the root causes of the loss which can
then aid performance. Mechanisms such as Early Retransmit [2] and Smart Framing [30] may be useful in this space
and warrant further study.
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Figure 3: LTN: Oracle vs. Stock SACK TCP

the bottleneck link than used in the LFN set of simulations.
However, we also note a similar decline in performance as
the BER increases, as we have illustrated previously. Further, with the Oracle’s help the performance is significantly
improved over stock TCP – again suggesting that mechanisms that offer TCP more information about the cause of
losses would be worthwhile to bulk data transfer applications.
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2.3 Competing Traffic
Figure 2: SFN: Oracle vs. Stock SACK TCP

To verify that the above results hold in a slightly more practical environment our next set of simulations involves comFigure 2 shows the performance of a single TCP connec- peting traffic. While this simulation is still not a realistic
tion over the SFN topology as a function of the BER on a Internet setting, it gives a glimpse of how TCP copes with
log-log plot. When compared to the LFN simulations pre- corruption-based loss when there is also contention for botsented above, the SFN plot shows that the shorter RTT of tleneck resources between various traffic flows. The simulathe network aids TCP performance by tightening the con- tions presented in this section involve a four node topology
gestion control loop. Stock SACK’s performance first drops with a TCP source and TCP destination separated by two
below full utilization (by roughly 85%) at a BER of 10 8 in routers. The link between the end nodes and the routers has
this set of simulations – much later than the BER of 10 11 a capacity of 10 Mbps and a one-way delay of 1 msec. The
where the dropoff first occurs in the LFN case presented link between the routers has a capacity of 1.5 Mbps, a oneabove. Additionally, we see the performance at the worst way delay of 250 msec and router queue sizes set based
BER is an order of magnitude better than the same point on the delay-bandwidth product of the path (these are the
in the LFN simulations. While the shorter feedback loop same settings used for the LTN experiments outlined above
aids TCP performance, the impact of corruption-based loss and shown in Figure 3). The competing traffic consists of
is still significant (over an order of magnitude difference at four constant-bit rate on/off UDP flows in each direction
high error rates). Finally, in these experiments we again over the bottleneck link (between the routers). The on and
observe the power in being able to determine the cause of off times of the flows are dictated by an exponential raneach packet loss and how that power is diminished as the dom process with mean on and off times of 0.5 sec. When
connection starts to rely on the RTO for loss recovery.
on each flow sends at 0.25 Mbps. When all competing flows
Finally, Figure 3 shows the performance of a single TCP are active they consume two-thirds of the bottleneck capacconnection over the LTN topology as a function of the BER ity. The first UDP flow in each direction is started 60 msec
plotted on a log-log scale. In this plot we see that TCP into the simulation, with an additional UDP flow starting
has lower goodput due to the smaller amount of capacity on in each direction every 50 msec (until four on/off flows are
4

3 A Taxonomy of Corruption Notification and Response Mechanisms

active in each direction).

Goodput (bytes/sec)
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In this section we present a taxonomy describing the range
of mechanisms that can be used for loss discrimination, explicit transport notification, and mitigation. First, we offer the following definitions to clearly distinguish different
transport protocol mechanisms, as illustrated in Figure 5:
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Figure 4: LTN with competing traffic

Figure 4 shows the average goodput of the end-to-end TCP
connection over 30 simulation runs as a function of the BER
on a log-log plot. The figure shows the same general trends
illustrated in the single connection LTN case. The impact
of the bursty on/off traffic is to reduce the available bottleneck capacity by roughly one-third4. The figure shows that
corruption-based loss negatively impacts stock TCP performance in a scenario with competing traffic. Further, the
figure shows that with perfect knowledge a TCP sender can
enjoy performance benefits across a range of BERs, but the
benefits diminish as the BER increases and TCP relies more
heavily on the RTO for loss recovery.

Flow control is exerted by the receiver to prevent the
sender from transmitting data at a rate that exceeds the
capacity of the receiver.
Congestion control [15] and avoidance is used to prevent the sender from transmitting data too quickly for
the network to handle.
Error control is a function needed for the reliable delivery of data; this function is responsible for retransmitting information that is lost (due to either corruption or
congestion) between the sender and receiver.

Transport Layer Control

Error Control

Flow Control

Congestion Control

...

...
Error Control Response

Loss Notification

...
Congestion Notification

Corruption Notification

...

...

Figure 5: Transport Layer Control

In this paper we are concerned with error control, in particular discriminating loss that is caused by corruption from loss
caused by congestion. Congestion-based losses are caused
2.4 Discussion
by resource contention or control in networks. For instance,
packets arriving at a router that has exhausted its buffer
The results in this section confirm previous work (e.g. [9, 8,
memory may be dropped – indicating contention caused by
41, 40] in showing that schemes that allow a sending TCP
a mismatch in the packet arrival and packet departure rates
to determine the cause of a segment loss would be useful to
at the router. In this paper we will use the term congestion
bulk transfer applications, especially in networks with nonloss to refer to packets not arriving at their destination due
negligible packet corruption rates. This conclusion holds
to resource contention somewhere along the path.
across a number of different network types and a range of
BERs. We classify the solution space for mitigations in the Corruption is generally caused either by channel errors
(such as background noise or interference) or by hardware
next section.
errors in network components [44]. Corruption can consist of bit errors, packet loss, or burst errors, depending on
the duration of a particular error event. We will use the
4 The UDP flows are expected to consume one-third of the capacity
term corruption loss to refer to packets that do not arrive
since the flows are set up to consume two-thirds of the bottleneck capacity
when all flows are sending at the same time and the flows are configured intact at their destination due to the information contained
to send roughly half the time.
in the packet (either header or payload) being unexpectedly
5

changed5 during transit.

TCP Westwood is a sender-side modification to TCP Reno
that continuously estimates the bottleneck capacity for the
end-to-end path (based on the times when acknowledgments are received), and adjusts the congestion window
based on the estimated capacity [14]. Since packets dropped
due to corruption should not reduce the estimated capacity
(assuming accurate measurements and estimation), the loss
discrimination is therefore implicitly included in the congestion response.

3.1 Loss Discrimination
Loss discrimination refers to determining whether a packet
loss event was due to corruption or congestion. We define
two major classes of loss discrimination: implicit and explicit.

TCP Peach, a congestion control scheme proposed for satellite networks, uses dummy segments (that must be treated
as low-priority segments by all intermediate nodes) to probe
the availability of network resources [1]. If all the dummy
segments are acknowledged, then the sender interprets this
as evidence that there are unused resources in the network
and accordingly can increase its transmission rate. In TCPPeach, corruption errors are not explicitly notified, but instead implicitly accounted for by the capacity estimation
strategy.

3.1.1 Implicit Loss Discrimination
Implicit loss discrimination does not rely on mechanisms
that definitively identify the causes of packet losses. Rather,
implicit discrimination mechanisms make assumptions on
the cause of loss to determine the appropriate error, flow,
or congestion control response. This inference can span the
range:



All losses are due to congestion; this assumption is
valid in networks that are engineered to have highly reliable links, and is generally valid for wired networks.
This is the assumption that TCP makes and has prevented congestion collapse in the traditional wired Internet. This assumption is conservative in that it errs
on the side of protecting the network at the expense of
performance when loss is not caused by congestion.

3.1.2 Explicit Loss Discrimination
Explicit loss discrimination is based on mechanisms that explicitly signal loss due to corruption, congestion, or both.

It is important to note that corruption cannot be directly
inferred from explicit congestion notification (e.g., ECN
[21]), and vice versa. This is due to the fact that a
 Losses may either be due to corruption or due to con- given packet may experience both congestion as well as
gestion, or both. It may be possible to use additional be dropped due to corruption. Furthermore, in cases where
information (e.g., grouping of packet losses, and de- these mechanisms are cumulative or statistical in nature, it
lay variations) to better infer the cause of loss. For becomes more difficult to infer one from the other.
example, networks that use a different form of congestion control than TCP’s loss-based scheme (e.g., delay- In this paper we focus primarily on explicit loss discrimibased congestion control [13] or congestion control nation. We present a taxonomy for explicit transport error
that relies on explicit information from the network notification (ETEN) mechanisms next. We examine ETEN
mechanisms along two orthogonal axes, namely, node be[25]) could enable such inference.
havior and control loop issues.
 All losses are due to corruption; this assumption is
valid in lossy networks where there is no chance of
congestion, either due to overprovisioning or guaran- 3.2 ETEN Node Behavior
teed resource reservation.
There are two classes of behavior of concern to ETEN: notification and response. This is reflected in the behavior of
Previous work (e.g., [10]) concluded that implicit loss distwo types of nodes:
crimination is not an effective strategy. However, congestion avoidance behaviors based on accurate estimation
1. The sender is the transport endpoint that transmits
of the end-to-end path capacity can enhance TCP perfordata, and is typically responsible for response behavmance in certain environments in which losses can occur
ior. In the case of reliable end-to-end communication,
both due to congestion and corruption. Examples of congesthis is the node that will be required to retransmit data
tion avoidance behaviors that implicitly account for corrupthat has not successfully reached the receiver. In the
tion losses based on path capacity estimation include TCP
case of TCP, the sender is also responsible for congesWestwood [14] and TCP Peach [1].
tion control decisions6 .
5
Some packet transformations, such as TTL reduction, are expected
and are not considered to be packet corruption.

6 The

6

sender ultimately controls the data transmission rate and so is

Sender observations consist of understanding corruption
signaling from the notifier (whether as explicit ETEN signaling messages or embedded in returning acknowledgments), congestion information (whether explicitly signaled
as in ECN or inferred as in the lack of an acknowledgment),
as well as local observations on its own environment, such
as offered load.

2. The notifier is a node that detects a corruption event
and initiates a notification that will ultimately reach the
sender. The notifier may involve the receiving node, or
the intermediate nodes along the communication path.
Note that in this work we are concerned with only corruption losses that are end-to-end in scope. Generally speaking, mechanisms that attempt local recovery of lost packets and try to hide those losses from the sender are out
of scope for this paper. In particular, link-layer retransmissions, link-layer Forward Error Correction (FEC) and
performance-enhancing proxies [12] (e.g., snoop [9]) may
be used in conjunction with the mechanisms involving the
end-hosts discussed in this paper, but are specifically out of
scope for our discussions.

Sender decisions determine what action should take place
based on notification and other observations, for example
the time and granularity of retransmissions. A key additional decision is the determination of the likelihood that
a given loss event is due to congestion, particularly in the
absence of explicit congestion notification. As mentioned
earlier, this cannot be correctly inferred in the absence of an
ETEN notification, since a given loss event may be due to
both corruption and congestion.

The sender and notifier nodes each exhibit observation, decision, and action behaviors, discussed briefly in the following subsections.

Sender actions are simply the actions taken in response to
corruption, including packet retransmission and dynamic
FEC strength adjustment. Additionally, sender actions include the appropriate congestion control action, such as
throttling the sender’s transmission rate.

3.2.1 Notifier Behavior

The notifier, as defined earlier, is either an intermediate or The next section describes various control mechanisms that
receiving node that detects corruption and is responsible for can be applied to the notifier–sender control loop. In some
cases the sender and notifier behavior are highly dependent
acting in a manner that will ultimately notify the sender.
on one another. For example, if the notifier uses out-ofNotifier observations consist of detecting corruption events, band backward ETEN signaling messages to indicate corfor example due to a checksum calculation or feedback from ruption, the sender must be capable of receiving and parsthe link layer.
ing the messages. In other cases, the notifier and sender
Notifier decisions determine when and how to make corrup- may operate independently. For example, the granularity
tion notifications. For example, in the case of cumulative of corruption notification may be smaller than, equal to, or
ETEN the notifier will have to determine the time interval larger than the granularity of sender retransmission.
over which to compute corruption statistics and the times
at which the notifications should occur. If multiple mechanisms are in effect, the notifier must decide which is the
appropriate one to use.
Notifier actions are the signaling mechanisms used to report
corruption-based loss. This may range from sending an explicit ETEN signaling message directly back to the sender
on the detection of a corrupted packet (out-of-band backward packet-granularity ETEN) to modifying a header field
that is accumulating path corruption statistics (in-band forward cumulative ETEN). Notifier action might also consist
of dropping a corrupted packet or merely marking it as corrupt as it is forwarded. The range of actions is discussed
further in Section 3.3.

3.3 Control Loop
Corruption notification and response involves a control loop
between the notifier nodes that are involved in the detection
and notification of corruption and the sender of information
that must respond in order to enable recovery from the corruption losses. The notifiers may be intermediate network
nodes, the receiver, or both.
In the following subsections, we describe in detail the various aspects of this control loop, namely: (i) feedback, (ii)
locus, (iii) granularity, (iv ) in vs. out-of-band signaling, (v )
direction of control information flow, and ( vi) determinism.

3.2.2 Sender Behavior
The sender is the node that will have to take actions to retransmit data once it has been notified.

We illustrate the taxonomy from the perspective of the response in Figure 6, and provide a notification-centric perspective in Figure 7.

always at least a component of congestion control.
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lation, else the payload may also have to be corrected at intermediate routers) to ensure mis-forwarding. Furthermore,
The ETEN feedback loop can be open, closed, or a hybrid. for any given path MTU, the use of variable strength FEC
Closed-loop feedback requires that acknowledgments (pos- means that the MSS seen by TCP will fluctuate with the
itive or negative) are returned to the sender to indicate which corruption rate.
packets have been received intact and which have been cor- The interactions of end-to-end TCP mechanisms for flow
rupted7. This is typically an ARQ mechanism with a num- control, loss recovery, and congestion avoidance with eraber of possible variants such as go-back-n and selective re- sure codes is much more subtle. There is tension between
erasure codes, on the one hand, trying to mask all packet
peat.
Open-loop feedback uses forward error correction (FEC) to losses (whether due to congestion or corruption including
provide statistical guarantees on a packet’s successful trans- fades) and prevent retransmissions, while TCP on the other
mission. Often FEC schemes are tightly coupled with a par- hand, relying on the congestion losses to provide feedback to congestion avoidance mechanisms. This masking of
ticular channel corruption model.
losses challenges the fundamental ETEN goal of being able
Hybrid open/closed-loop feedback combines both to discriminate between corruption and congestion packet
mechanisms: open-loop FEC to reduce the need for losses.
acknowledgment-based retransmissions, with acknowledgments as necessary to trigger retransmits and guarantee the TCP ACKs carry the sequence number of the next byte of
delivery of data (or, at least an understanding by the sender data the receiver expects to arrive. This allows the sender to
determine packet losses and adjust the congestion window.
that the data was not successfully delivered).
When erasure codes are used, this feedback is insufficient
There are fundamentally two ways in which FEC strate- since the last segment being accounted for (as received)
gies can be used for ETEN: either the error correction code may belie the fact that some packets could have been lost
can be contained entirely within each packet or it can be due to congestion (but were reconstructed at the receiver).
distributed across multiple packets. In the first case, each Enough packets must be dropped so as to exceed the capapacket can include additional bits of error correcting infor- bility of the code before the TCP sender is actually notified
mation; intermediate nodes can detect and if possible cor- of congestion. This added delay might make the congestion
rect corruption before forwarding the packet. A large num- avoidance loop unstable.
ber of error correcting codes that are effective under differSolving this problem requires that we keep track not only
ent error models are available.
the sequence number of the payload data but also the seIn the second case, erasure codes can be used that allow cor- quence number of the encoded packets. In this case, TCP
rupted packets to be dropped while allowing the end points congestion avoidance could use this latter sequence number.
to recover the information from additional redundant pack- This will require the addition of this information to the IP
ets. The Stutter XOR scheme [24] is an example of a simple or TCP packet headers (perhaps in the form of an option).
erasure code. More sophisticated codes have been applied
Furthermore, with erasure codes, the receiving TCP has to
to packet switched networks [43, 29, 39].
wait for the possibility of subsequent packets correcting a
Deployment challenges for FEC schemes with TCP/IP: loss. This can conflict with the settings of the retransmit
There are significant challenges to combining FEC with timer and the delayed acknowledgment timer.
some form of ETEN for TCP/IP. Any reliable transport
protocol must still provide end-to-end ARQ to guarantee
packet delivery. TCP, in particular, uses ARQ in its com- 3.3.2 Locus of ETEN
bined error, flow, and congestion control algorithms; the
addition of, and interaction with, FEC may add significant We use locus of control to describe the span of the ETEN
control loop, in particular to define the notifier node or
protocol complexity.
nodes that are responsible for corruption detection and reIn the case of satellite or wireless links, per-packet FEC canporting back to the sender.
not protect against all non-congestion packet losses, for example, channel fades. Furthermore, IP routers simply drop End-to-End (E2E) ETEN relies only on the receiver to serve
erroneous packets to prevent mis-forwarding [6]. With per- as the notifier that detects corruption and informs the sender.
packet FEC, intermediate IP routers would be required to Hop-by-Hop (HBH) ETEN relies on nodes along the path
correct packet headers (provided there is no IP-IP encapsu- to serve as notifiers to detect and report corruption. HBH
3.3.1 Feedback

schemes involve the intermediate network nodes (switches
or routers) as well as the receiver (for the last hop). Additionally, the receiver will be involved in any necessary

7 The

sender must have some default behavior to avoid becoming deadlocked if an acknowledgment does not arrive (e.g., a timeout with a default
assumption about the cause of loss).
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end-to-end recovery notification, including relaying forward ETEN messages to the sender (as discussed in Section 3.3.5). Note that even though we generally think of
TCP/IP as having only end-to-end loss recovery, the IP
checksum and IP router semantics that require the dropping
of corrupted packets [6] is a HBH component of the TCP/IP
loss recovery process.
From a deployment perspective, ETEN mechanisms that allow selected intermediate nodes in a path to participate in
the corruption detection and notification scheme are more
desirable than those ETEN mechanisms which require all
intermediate nodes in the path to participate. The former
has the significant practical advantage of allowing selective deployment of nodes that need corruption notification
mechanisms rather than requiring massive replacement of
network infrastructure. For example, candidates for the deployment of ETEN notifier nodes are wireless access points
and gateways, and switches that terminate long-haul wireless and satellite links.

Another is to obtain this information from link layer recovery mechanisms (e.g., the upstream neighbor that had
to retransmit a packet can generate such notifications). In
the absence of such mechanisms, observations and notifications of corruption loss have to be at a coarser granularity,
described next.
Cumulative ETEN (CETEN) mechanisms are needed when
the notifier nodes can only calculate cumulative corruption
rates for each link. In other words, the information in the
header of a corrupted packet is considered inaccurate and
cannot be constructed with enough confidence to allow PETEN mechanisms to perform well.
The cumulative CETEN information conveyed to the endhosts can be in one of several different forms:



3.3.3 Granularity
The granularity of ETEN corruption feedback refers to the
scope over which corruption detection, notification, and response actions are taken. At the highest level, we refer to
the granularity as either per-packet (PETEN) or cumulative
(CETEN).
Packet-based (PETEN) mechanisms are able to detect, report, and respond to individual packet corruption events.
Per-packet notifiers are able to properly convey the fact that
individual packets have been corrupted; per-packet senders
are able to retransmit those (and only those) packets that
require retransmission. The Oracle ETEN described in Section 2.1 is a PETEN with the ability to perfectly determine
addressing and sequence numbers for each packet.




An absolute corruption rate (bit-based, byte-based or
packet-based) observed within a moving window in
time. The corruption rate may be quantized into a
small number of steps (for example, high, medium,
and low). A binary feedback scheme [38] (see also
[36, 37]) is a special case that provides indication
that the bit/byte/packet corruption rate exceeds some
threshold.
A relative corruption rate that simply indicates that the
quantized corruption rate has increased or decreased
from the previous value.
An estimate of the probability that a packet survives
corruption.

There are various possibilities for the aggregation of the cumulative corruption statistics from each notifier (e.g., perflow, per-path, per-link, or per-node). Furthermore, CETEN
information can be collected on a per-hop basis or aggregated over the end-to-end path. Due to the difficulty in
correctly assigning corrupted packets to their correspondPETEN requires not only that the sender and notifier per- ing flows, any per-flow CETEN information has to be estiform corruption detection and notification on a per-packet mated, for example from what is observed across all flows
granularity, but that the notifiers that detect corruption are using a given link. Estimating and correctly attributing the
able to properly identify corrupted or obliterated packets. fraction of the observed aggregate corruption loss rate on
Thus, the source and destination address as well as the se- a per-flow basis can add significant complexity to the node
quence number must be available or reconstructed. In the (except perhaps at the receiver). Determining whether this
case of TCP, this consists of the source and destination IP can be done reliably (and if so, how) requires further study.
addresses, the source and destination TCP ports, and the We investigate CETEN further in Section 4.
TCP sequence number. In addition, the packet in question
must be part of the sender’s current window; otherwise, the The applicability of PETEN and CETEN mechanisms to
opportunity to mitigate the performance problems caused various application and network scenarios under various error models also requires further study.
by the corrupted packet is lost.
In practice PETEN may be challenging since it requires that
the notifier have a reliable mechanism with which it can determine the transport endpoints. One solution to consider
is to separately protect the header by a strong FEC check.

3.3.4 In-Band vs. Out-of-Band Signaling
ETEN signaling can either be out-of-band or in-band.
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Out-of-band (OB) signaling uses distinct ETEN signaling
messages (e.g., using ICMP) that are propagated from the
notifier node to the sender (either backward or forward, as
described in the following subsection).

to the same flow. This requires the maintenance of sufficient
per-flow state to find a subsequent packet on the same flow.
The other approach is to forward the corrupted packet (suitably marked or encapsulated) and pass it along to the desIn-band (IB) signaling modifies or piggybacks on the head- tination (subsequent nodes must also forward this packet),
ers of data packets and acknowledgments. In-band signal- rather than dropping it (as currently required by IP router
ing is particularly attractive for CETEN schemes that prop- semantics [6]). The destination in turn can notify the sender
agate corruption statistics in the packet header. In this case, of the packet lost due to corruption.
each CETEN-capable intermediate notifier node modifies
the corruption rate carried in the packet header, so that when 3.3.6 Determinism
the packet reaches its destination the receiver knows the
path corruption rate.
The last aspect of the ETEN control mechanism to consider
Note that for packet-based PETEN, if corrupted packets are is how deterministic actions are.
dropped (as in IP [6]), the ETEN indication must be contained in other packets belonging to the same flow. Alternatively, if the packet header is separately protected by an
error check and only the payload is corrupted, the packet
could be marked as corrupt and forwarded towards the destination.

Deterministic actions are used when a particular response is
needed and sufficient knowledge is available. An example
of deterministic action by the notifier is the transmission of
a backward PETEN message for a corrupted packet from
which the header could be correctly decoded. A deterministic sender response would be to retransmit this packet.

Probabilistic actions are taken based on information that
is statistical or inferred without certainty. An example of
3.3.5 Direction of Notification
probabilistic notifier behavior is transmission of a backward
PETEN message when the header cannot be fully reconNotifications can either be sent directly back to the sender, structed (but perhaps inferred with reasonable confidence
or proceed to the destination to be returned to the sender.
based on comparing the corrupted packet’s header with colBackward ETEN propagates notifications backward, analo- lected per-flow state). An example of sender probabilistic
gous to backward explicit congestion notification schemes behavior is adjusting the congestion window a fraction of
(e.g., source-quench [34] and ATM BECN [5]). In these the time based on an estimate of the fraction of losses due
cases notifiers use out-of-band signaling messages destined to congestion (as will be described in Section 4).
to the sender.
In this section, we provided a taxonomy of the ETEN soluIt is also conceivable to piggyback backward ETEN infor- tion space. The key issues are:
mation in returning acknowledgments to the sender (i.e., in where, how, and what information about corruption is
band Backward ETEN), but this adds significant complexity
observed and tracked by the notifier
to the notifier.
Forward ETEN propagates notifications forward to the destination, analogous to forward explicit congestion notification schemes (e.g., ATM FECN [5] and IP-based ECN
[36, 37, 21]).
If separate messages are generated per-packet corruption
loss, it is easy to see that backward PETEN could lead to
faster loss repair than forward PETEN. The potential performance benefit of using Backward ETEN is higher if the
corruption occurs closer to the sender and increases with the
round-trip delay of the path.
Two in-band signaling alternatives that do not require generation of new packets for Forward ETEN exist. With the
first alternative, the intermediate notifier node that detects
a corrupted packet can convey this information by marking or modifying headers of subsequent packets. If reliable
per-flow assignment of the corruption is possible, then this
operation can be restricted to subsequent packets belonging
11






how does the notifier decide on when and by what
means to convey the information to the sender
what information related to loss recovery does the
sender track and how
how does the sender decide how to discriminate among
losses, and by what means to recover from losses
design of mechanisms to detection, notification, and
response of corruption losses

We discussed that various alternatives exist for each one of
these issues. The potential gains in Section 2 motivates further exploration and evaluation of the alternatives, in terms
of how well they perform and how best to combine them
into an end-to-end solution. In the next section, we present
a promising new CETEN approach that combines particular
approaches within this space.

4 Cumulative ETEN
The last two sections of this paper have broadly and generally discussed the implications of corruption-based loss on
TCP performance and what mechanisms could be used to
counteract the impact of corruption-based loss. In this section we narrow our focus to a novel class of mitigation for
combating the impact of corruption-based loss. In this section we explore Cumulative Explicit Transport Error Notification (CETEN) techniques that are applicable when sufficient information about the cause of specific packet drops is
not available to the transport layer endpoints. Rather, using
CETEN the TCP sender relies on corruption rate statistics
provided by the network to drive the behavior of the congestion control algorithms. In this section, we describe two
CETEN strategies and present a brief set of simulations that
show their promise. The CETEN presentation in this paper
is preliminary and meant to suggest a new mechanism that
attempts to achieve the ideals presented in Section 2. More
in-depth treatments of CETEN issues are provided in [18]
and [17].

In the experiments presented in this paper r represents the
configured link corruption rate rather than a corruption rate
that is tracked over time. Using the configured corruption
rate as r allows us to assess the upper bound on the performance improvements that are possible without any estimation error. Designing methods to track the corruption rate
is clearly a rich area of future work. Possible schemes for
arriving at error rates (and smoothing/averaging them over
time) are limitless. A possible approach is given in [27]. Finally, we verified the observed corruption rate to be within
10% of the configured corruption rate in our simulations.
We note that there is a delay between an intermediate host
noting its corruption rate and the sender ultimately receiving that information. The delay is less than the RTT of
the network path. We believe this delay is tolerable given
that we envision the intermediate node reporting corruption
rates somehow averaged over a number of RTTs. However, if corruption rates are to be reported for shorter time
intervals then the delay in getting the information to the
TCP sender may play a part in the overall effectiveness of
CETEN. Such a scenario is not explored in this paper and is
left as future work.

4.1 Determining the Packet Corruption Rate
The first problem we tackle is that of transmitting rich information about the corruption rate detected within the network to the transport endpoints. The mechanism we employ
in our study adds a corruption survival-probability field to
each packet. This value represents the probability that a
packet avoids corruption as it traverses the network path.
The survival probability field is initialized to 1.0 by the
source of the packet and is updated by intermediate nodes
along the path (as described in more detail below). When
a packet arrives at the receiver the survival probability contained in the packet is the survival probability of the entire path. The transport endpoint at the destination keeps a
record of the survival probability of the forward path and
echoes the probability back to the sender in the next ACK
packet transmitted. As discussed in Section 3 there are alternative methods for gathering the information. Experimenting with those methods is left as future work.

4.2 Computing the Total Loss Rate
Loss can be either due to congestion or corruption 9. In theory, if a TCP knew how to ascertain the fraction of losses
due to one cause (say, losses due to corruption, as outlined
above) and if the TCP can determine the total loss rate, then
the TCP can determine the losses due to the other cause. A
natural method for ascertaining the total loss rate is for the
TCP sender to count the number of retransmissions. However, as shown in [3] this method ends up significantly overestimating the total loss rate due to TCP’s sometimes gross
retransmission strategies. A family of algorithms (called
LE AS T ) is presented in [3] that TCP senders can use to
estimate the total loss rate to within 10% of the actual loss
rate in over 90% of the TCP connections studied (using the
NIMI mesh of Internet measurement points [32]).

An alternative approach to estimating the total loss rate is to
have the network inform the TCP endpoint about the current
Each intermediate node in the path is responsible for trackcongestion-survival probability, much like the scheme outing the corruption rate, r, on their incoming links8 . Each inlined above for corruption information; [27] outlines such
termediate node then multiplies the path corruption survival
a scheme. In addition, the XCP congestion control techprobability field from each packet header by the node’s own
nique [25] could also be leveraged to help disambiguate the
estimate of the link corruption survival probability, ( 1 r),
cause of losses. The biggest weakness of such an “in-thefor the link on which the packet arrived. The exact method
network” scheme is that if some congested routers do not
for arriving at the link error rate is a subject for future wor k.
participate they cause the sender to overestimate the frac8 In practice, we only expect intermediate nodes connected to links experiencing non-negligible amounts of corruption to implement CETEN.
An intermediate node that does not experience corruption loss will essentially not change the path state and therefore the work involved would be
wasted effort.
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9 Exactly how to handle the case described in the last section when a
packet experiences both congestion and corruption is outside the scope of
this paper. Also, in our simulations loss is either caused by congestion or
corruption and never crosses into this gray area.

tion of losses attributed to corruption (by underestimating
e
1 + ( np )k
the congestion rate) and therefore inject more traffic into the
M DF =
(1)
n  1; k > 0; p > 0
network than appropriate. In-the-network strategies require
2
less accounting on the part of the TCP sender/receiver; however, there also could be issues relating to the soundness of where p is the total packet loss rate, e is the corruption loss
the estimates of corruption and congestion in the network. rate and n and k are parameters allow for the shaping and
bounding of the MDF. In the experiments presented in this
For the work presented in this paper we use the LE AS T paper we use n = k = 1 which provides a congestion reloss estimation technique in the TCP sender to estimate the sponse as if the only losses were those caused by congestotal loss rate when needed.
tion. When n = k = 1 and all loss is caused by congestion
the standard MDF of one-half is used. However, if all loss
is due to packet corruption an MDF of 1 is used (i.e., no
4.3 Alternate Congestion Responses
cwnd reduction). Varying n and k can make the response
more conservative (or more aggressive) and likely has imIn this section, we address the question of what the sender plications on fairness. Future work should include expercould do with the corruption probability estimates and how imenting with these shaping parameters, but such work is
TCP’s congestion response may be changed to incorporate beyond the scope of the initial evaluation presented in this
this new information. We specify two different schemes paper. Finally, note that any continuous monotonically inthat could be used by a TCP sender to mitigate the perfor- creasing function based on e that is no more aggressive than
mance impact of corruption. These are far from the only Equation 1 with n = k = p1 can be used to determine the
two schemes that could be used. However, determining the MDF.
best variant for general use is beyond the scope of this paper.

4.4 CETEN Simulations
4.3.1 Probabilistic: C E T E NP

To investigate CETEN we implemented both C E T E NA
and C E T E NP in ns-2. CETEN is implemented in the
Given that TCP has inferred loss(es) from duplicate ac- ns sack1 TCP variant rather than the FullTcpSack variant
knowledgments [4], selective acknowledgments (SACKs) used in Section 2 because sack1 supports DSACK (which
[28] and/or retransmission timeouts [33] TCP needs a is needed for the estimate of p). The simulations conway to decide on a congestion control response. For the sist of a four node network with TCP end points separated
C E T E NP variant we use a weighted coin flip based on
by two routers. The routers are connected to each other
the estimated fraction of the losses due to corruption, pe , with a 5 Mbps link with a 40 msec one-way propagation
where e is the fraction of packets dropped due to corruption delay. The routers use drop-tail queues with 150 packet
and p is the fraction of packets dropped for any reason. If, buffer sizes. A uniform random process is used to insert
probabilistically, a particular loss is attributed to packet cor- corruption-based drops on the link between the routers. The
ruption the lost segment can be retransmitted without mod- corruption-rate is varied (as shown in our results). Each host
ifying the congestion control state. Otherwise, the TCP re- is connected to a router via a 10 Mbps link with a one-way
transmits the lost segment and invokes standard congestion propagation delay of 3 msec. The TCP endpoint uses an
control procedures (i.e., reducing the congestion window by advertised window of 500 segments – enough to never be
half). While C E T E NP may not correctly choose whether a performance issue in our simulations. The hosts use an
to change TCP’s congestion control state on any particular MSS of 1460 bytes and delayed ACKs. This scenario is difloss, the goal is to provide the appropriate average, long- ferent from the scenarios used in Section 2. The TCP sender
term congestion response without incurring the traditional estimates the total loss rate using the DSACK version of the
susceptibility to losses caused by corruption.
LE AS T algorithm [3]. This simulation setup allows for the
TCP to self-congest the network (i.e., a single TCP connection can consume the network capacity and the entire router
4.3.2 Adaptive adjustment: C E T E NA
queue causing congestion-based losses to occur). All simAn alternative to the binary decision with regards to invok- ulations are run for 1 hour to assess the long-term average
ing congestion control offered by C E T E NP , C E T E NA sending rate. The following results represent the average of
provides an adaptive scheme that reacts to each loss, 30 random simulations.
but not by using the traditional multiplicative decrease The situation presented in this section is more akin to a terfactor (MDF) that stock TCP uses (one-half). Rather, restrial wireless network than those previously explored in
C E T E NA ’s MDF is defined as:
Section 2. Since the TCP model is generally discussed in
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terms of packet loss rates rather than bit-error rates, we use
the fraction of packets lost when discussing the drop prevalence in this section as opposed to the bit-error rates used
in previous sections. All corruption rates used in Section 2
represent less than a 1% packet drop rate. In this section,
most of the packet error rates used are at least 1%. In other
words, the experiments presented in this section generally
have a higher prevalence of corruption than in the experiments presented in Section 2.
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ever, on any specific loss event C E T E NP could “guess
wrong” and take the “wrong” action. For instance, if a loss
is caused by corruption, C E T E NP may decide to reduce
cwnd. The hope is that later when there is a congestionbased loss C E T E NP will even things out by not reducing
cwnd. However, in the simulations presented in Figure 8
this notion does not play out as planned. When there is only
one connection in the network that connection is solely responsible for network congestion. Therefore, when congestion occurs and C E T E NP decides not to reduce cwnd the
congestion is still present and more losses will occur. In
effect, C E T E NP is forced to reduce the cwnd when congestion occurs. So, while C E T E NP prevents the cwnd
from being reduced in some cases when corruption occurs,
the connection does not get the entire benefit envisioned,
and hence, experiences lower performance compared to
C E T E NA . In a network with more statistical multiplexing C E T E NP may perform better (closer to C E T E NA )
because a single connection will not be the sole cause of
congestion. Therefore, when a congestion event occurs and
a C E T E NP connection maintains its cwnd the connection
may not incur further congestion because competing traffic
will also likely be backing off.

The second set of CETEN simulations involves competing
traffic. The four node topology described above is again
Figure 8: CETENP and CETENA vs. stock SACK TCP. employed. In this set of tests we run a single TCP connection in each direction across the network. In addition,
The first set of simulations involve a single TCP flow we run five on/off constant-bit rate (CBR) flows across the
across the network described above. In these simulations network in each direction. The CBR flows are driven by
corruption-based losses are applied to only the data packets an exponential random process that has a mean on time of
traversing the bottleneck link (i.e., not for the ACK traffic 2.5 sec and a mean off time of 10 sec. When on, each CBR
flowing back to the sender). Figure 8 shows TCP perfor- flow sends at 1 Mbps. Therefore, when all the CBR flows
mance as a function of the corruption-rate plotted on a log- are running they would consume the bottleneck capacity.
log scale. The plot shows the performance drop-off of stock The TCP connection is set up as described for the single
TCP SACK. In addition, the figure illustrates that both ver- flow tests above. Corruption-based losses are inserted in
sions of CETEN offer better performance than stock TCP both directions of the bottleneck link according to a uniform
SACK – even though CETEN’s performance does decrease random process.
as the corruption rate increases.
Figure 9 shows TCP performance as a function of the corThe cause of CETEN’s performance reductions at high ruption rate applied to the bottleneck link on a log-log
packet corruption rates is largely dropped retransmissions. plot. Again, this plot illustrates the power of CETEN to
TCP SACK relies on the RTO timer to cope with retrans- increase performance over stock TCP. Also, this plot shows
missions that are dropped. The RTO timer represents a that C E T E N provides better performance enhancement
P
lengthy inactive period, as well as a second cwnd reduction. at high error rates than shown above for single flow experiWe do note that even though performance is dropping off at ments. This suggests that the above note about C E T E N
P
a packet corruption rate of 20%, C E T E NA still achieves working better in an environment with a high degree of
more than an order of magnitude increase when compared statistical multiplexing may be accurate (but must be verito stock TCP.
fied completely using more complex simulations with comAnother notable aspect of Figure 8 is the difference in peting congestion-aware traffic). With competing traffic
performance between C E T E NA and C E T E NP – even CETEN shows performance improvements of 1–2 orders of
though they are intuitively attempting to achieve the same magnitude over stock TCP SACK at high error rates.
notion. The notion behind C E T E NP is that it reduces
cwnd roughly the right number of times over the course of a
long transfer to compensate for network congestion. How14

with non-negligible corruption-based packet loss. While
promising, CETEN also has numerous theoretical and practical issues that require attention before the strategy will be
useful for general, wide-scale deployment.
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4.5 Discussion
Our preliminary simulations have shown CETEN to be a
promising approach in mitigating the problems corruptionbased losses pose to TCP performance in wireless and satellite networks. However, many questions remain before
the community could even consider CETEN for wide-scale
adoption, such as: How do we derive corruption-survival
probabilities? Over what time scale? Should TCP and/or
the router keep a running or smoothed average of the congestion and corruption rates? How burdensome is CETEN
on the forwarding engines in routers? What can or should
be done about receivers sending bogus corruption reports in
an attempt to game congestion control (see [42])? These
and many additional questions will be the subject of future
work in this area.

The work presented in this paper was conducted with funding from NASA’s Glenn Research Center and NASA’s Earth
Science Technology Office under contract number NAS399175, as well as from the National Science Foundation
under grant number 0205519. James Sterbenz and Mark
Allman performed a portion of this work while they were
with BBN Technologies. Will Ivancic (NASA GRC), Steve
Polit (BBN Technologies) and the anonymous reviewers
provided very helpful comments on an earlier version of
this manuscript. Shawn Ostermann (Ohio University) and
David Mankins (BBN Technologies) contributed to the
CETEN experiments outlined in Section 4.

References
[1] I.F. Akyildiz, G. Morabito, and S. Palazzo, “TCP-Peach: A
New Congestion Control Scheme for Satellite IP Networks,”
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, Volume 9, Number
3, Pages 307–321, 2001.
[2] M. Allman, K. Avrachenkov, U. Ayesta and J. Blanton, “Early Retransmit for TCP and SCTP,” Internet-Draft
draft-allman-tcp-early-rexmt-03.txt, December 2003, work
in progress.
[3] M. Allman, W. Eddy, and S. Ostermann, “Estimating Loss
Rates With TCP,” ACM Performance Evaluation Review,
31(3), December 2003.
[4] M. Allman, V. Paxson, and W. Stevens, “TCP Congestion
Control,” Request for Comments: 2581, April 1999.

5 Summary
In this paper, we consider the problem of enhancing TCP
performance in the face of corruption losses, and make the
following contributions. We confirm previous studies that
show corruption-based loss causes performance problems
for TCP. In addition, we illustrate a plausible upper bound
on the performance TCP could attain with perfect knowledge about the causes of loss. We present a detailed taxonomy of the space of mitigations for the issues caused by
corruption-based loss. This taxonomy is a useful road-map
to researchers who wish to pursue alternative mitigation approaches. Finally, we offer a preliminary illustration of the
potential benefits of a previously unexplored portion of the
mitigation space. We show that CETEN is a promising
technique for improving TCP performance in environments
15

[5] ATM
Forum,
ATM
User
Network
Interface
(UNI)
Signalling
Specification
Version
4.1,
af-sig-0061.002,
April
2002,
available
from
www.atmforum.com/standards/approved.html.
[6] F. Baker, ed., “Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers,” Request for Comments: 1812, June 1995.
[7] A. Bakre and B. R. Badrinath, “I-TCP: Indirect TCP for
Mobile Hosts.” Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS), May
1995.
[8] H. Balakrishnan and R.H. Katz, “Explicit Loss Notification and Wireless Web Performance,” Proceedings of the
IEEE Globecom Internet Mini-Conference, Sydney, Australia, November 1998.
[9] H. Balakrishnan, V.N. Padmanabhan, S. Seshan, R.H. Katz,
“A Comparison of Mechanisms for Improving TCP Performance Over Wireless Links ,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on

Networking, Volume 5, Issue 6, December 1997, pp. 756–
769.
[10] S. Biaz, and N.H. Vaidya, “Distinguishing Congestion
Losses from Wireless Transmission Losses: A Negative Result,” Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference
on Computer Communications and Networks (IC3N), New
Orleans, October 1998.
[11] E. Blanton, M. Allman, K. Fall and Lili Wang, “A Conservative Selective Acknowledgment (SACK)-based Loss Recovery Algorithm for TCP,” Request for Comments: 3517, April
2003.
[12] J. Border, M. Kojo, J. Griner, G. Montenegro, and Z. Shelby,
“Performance Enhancing Proxies Intended to Mitigate LinkRelated Degradations,” Request for Comments: 3135, June
2001.
[13] L. Brakmo, S. O’Malley and L. Peterson, “TCP Vegas: New
Techniques for Congestion Detection and Avoidance”, Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM, August 1994.
[14] C. Casetti, M. Gerla, S. Mascolo, M.Y. Sansadidi, and R.
Wang, “TCP Westwood: End-to-End Congestion Control for
Wired/Wireless Networks,” Wireless Networks Journal, Volume 8, Pages 467–479, 2002.
[15] D.W. Davies, “The Control of Congestion in PacketSwitching Networks,” IEEE Transactions on Communications, Volume COM-20, Number 3, June 1972, pp. 546–550.
[16] S. Dawkins, G. Montenegro, M. Kojo, V. Magret, and N.
Vaidya, “End-to-end Performance implications of Links with
Errors,” Request for Comments: 3155, August 2001.

[25] D. Katabi, M. Handley, and C. Rohrs, “Internet Congestion
Control for Future High Bandwidth-Delay Product Environments,” Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM, August 2002.
[26] S. Kent, and R. Atkinson, “Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol,” Request for Comments: 2401, November
1998.
[27] R. Krishnan, M. Allman, C. Partridge, and J.P.G. Sterbenz,
“Explicit Transport Error Notification (ETEN) for ErrorProne Wireless and Satellite Networks”, Technical Report
TR-8333, BBN Technologies, March 2002.
[28] M. Mathis, J. Mahdavi, S. Floyd, and A. Romanow, “TCP
Selective Acknowledgment Options,” Request for Comments: 2018, October 1996.
[29] A.J. McAuley, “Reliable Broadband Communication Using
a Burst Erasure Code”, Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM ’90,
Philadelphia, PA, USA, September 1990.
[30] M. Mellia, M. Meo and C. Casetti, “TCP Smart Framing:
a Segmentation Algorithm to Improve TCP performance,”
Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on QoS in
Multiservice IP Networks (QoS-IP 2003), February 2003.
[31] ns-2 simulator, http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/index.html
[32] V. Paxson, J. Mahdavi, A. Adams and Matt Mathis, “An
Architecture for Large-Scale Internet Measurement,” IEEE
Communications, Volume 36, Number 8, August 1998, pp.
48–54.
[33] V. Paxson and M. Allman, “Computing TCP’s Retransmission Timer,” Request for Comments: 2988, November 2000.
[34] J. Postel, “Internet Control Message Protocol,” Request for
Comments: 792, September 1981.

[17] W. Eddy, “Improving TCP Performance with Path Error
Rate Information,” Master’s Thesis, Ohio University, March
2004.

[35] J. Postel (editor), “Transmission Control Protocol,” Request
for Comments: 793, September 1981.

[18] W. Eddy, S. Ostermann, and M. Allman, “New Techniques
for Making Transport Protocols Robust to Corruption-Based
Loss,” Under submission, January 2004.
[19] K. Fall and S. Floyd, “Simulation-based Comparisons of
Tahoe, Reno, and SACK TCP,” ACM Computer Communication Review, Volume 26, Number 3, July 1996, pp. 5–21.
[20] S. Floyd, and K. Fall, “Promoting the Use of End-to-End
Congestion Control in the Internet,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, August 1999, pp. 458–472.
[21] S. Floyd, “TCP and Explicit Congestion Notification,” ACM
Computer Communication Review, Volume 24, Number 5,
October 1994, pp. 10–23.
[22] C. Hayes, “Analyzing the Performance of New TCP Extensions Over Satellite Links,” Master’s Thesis, Ohio University, August 1997.

[36] K. Ramakrishnan, and S. Floyd, “A Proposal to add Explicit
Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP,” Request for Comments: 2481, January 1999.
[37] K. Ramakrishnan, S. Floyd, and D. Black, “The Addition of
Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP,” Request for
Comments: 3168, September 2001.
[38] K.K. Ramakrishnan, and R. Jain, “A Binary Feedback
Scheme for Congestion Avoidance,” ACM Transactions on
Computer Systems, Volume 8, Number 2, May 1990, pp.
158–181.
[39] L. Rizzo, “Effective Erasure Codes for Reliable Computer
Communication Protocols”, ACM Computer Communication Review, Volume 27, Number 2, April 1997, pp. 24–36.

[23] V. Jacobson, “Congestion Avoidance and Control,” Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM ’88, Stanford, CA, USA, August
1988.

[40] N. Samaraweera, “Non-Congestion Packet Loss Detection
for TCP Error Recovery Using Wireless Links,” IEE Proceedings in Communications, Volume 146, Number 4, August 1999, pp. 222–230.

[24] M.A. Jolfaei, B. Heinrichs, and M.R. Nazeman, “Improved
TCP Error Control for Heterogeneous WANs,” Proceedings
of the IEEE National Telesystems Conference, San Diego,
CA, USA, May 1994.

[41] N. Samaraweera, and G. Fairhurst, “Explicit Loss Indication
and Accurate RTO Estimation for TCP Error Recovery Using Satellite Links,” IEE Proceedings in Communications,
Volume 144, Number 1, February 1997, 47–53.

16

Gigabit Networking, chair of the IFIP Protocols for High
Speed Networks Steering Committee, member of the IFIP
Active Networks steering committee, senior member of the
IEEE, member of the ACM, IEE (UK), IEICE (Japan), the
[43] N. Shacham and P. McKenny, “Packet Recovery in High- Internet Society Interplanetary Special Interest Group, and
Speed Networks using Coding and Buffer Management”, on the editorial board of IEEE Network. He is author of the
Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM ’90, San Francisco, CA, book High-Speed Networking: A Systematic Approach to
June 1990.
High-Bandwidth Low-Latency Communication.

[42] S. Savage, N. Cardwell, D. Wetherall, and T. Anderson,
“TCP Congestion Control with a Misbehaving Receiver,”
ACM Computer Communications Review, Volume 29, Number 5, October 1999, pp. 71–78.

[44] J. Stone, and C. Partridge, “When the CRC and TCP Checksum Disagree,” Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM 2000,
Stockholm, Sweden, August 28 – September 1, 2000.

Wesley M. Eddy is currently a researcher at NASA’s Glenn
Research Center. The work described here was completed
while he was a student at Ohio University, where he earned
Rajesh Krishnan is a Senior Scientist at BBN Technolo- the B.S. and M.S. degrees in computer science in 2002 and
gies, Cambridge, MA, USA. At BBN’s Internetwork Re- 2004. His research interests include protocols for mobile
search Department since 1997, he has led and contributed to hosts and extending transport protocols for NASA missions.
several research efforts in the field of networking. He holds
the Ph.D. (2004) and M.S. (1996) degrees in Computer Engineering from Boston University, Boston, MA, USA, and
the B.E. (1991) degree with Honours in Electrical Engineering from the Regional Engineering College, Durgapur, West
Bengal, India. From 1991-1994, he worked for the Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Limited, Jamshedpur,
Bihar, India. He is a member of the ACM, the IEEE, and
the IEEE Communications Society.
Craig Partridge is a Chief Scientist at BBN Technologies,
where he has done data communications research for the
past 20 years. He is best known for designing how Internet
email is routed, and for his work on high performance networking. A Fellow of the IEEE and the ACM, Dr. Partridge
received his A.B., M.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees from Harvard
University.

James P.G. Sterbenz is a Visiting Research Scientist in
the Computer Networks Research Group at the University
of Massachusetts, Amherst. He has been PI for several
DARPA and NASA funded research programs in the areas
of survivable, disruption-tolerant, mobile, wireless, and active networking, and TCP and Web performance. He has
previously held senior research staff and management positions at BBN Technologies, GTE Laboratories, and IBM,
and holds a D.Sc. in Computer Science from Washington University in St. Louis. He is program co-chair for
IEEE Hot Interconnects 2004, and was program co-chair
of IWAN 2003, 2002, and PfHSN’99. He is past chair of
the IEEE Communications Society Technical Committee on
17

Mark Allman is a computer scientist with the International Computer Science Institute. His current research interests are in the areas of transport protocols, congestion
control, measuring network dynamics and network security.
Mark is involved in the Internet Engineering Task Force,
where he has chaired several working groups and BoFs and

is currently a member of the Transport Area Directorate.
Mark also chairs the Internet Measurement Research Group
within the Internet Research Task Force. Mark has served
on the program committee for numerous conferences and
workshops. Mark holds B.S. and M.S. degrees in computer
science from Ohio University and is a member of the ACM.

18

